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After the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Law (“DRBL”) took effect in 2006, the 
pro-debtor insolvency system including DIP-type trustee has been enforced.  However, the 
DRBL has not modified much with respect to the rights and obligations of the creditors, 
especially secured creditors. This article conducts an overall review on the treatment of secured 
creditors in the rehabilitation proceeding under the DRBL. 
Secured creditors have a priority to get paid when their secured property is sold or 
foreclosed. The insolvent debtor has to bargain with secured creditors if it needs to continue to 
use the secured property. Theoretically, the debtor shall be able to utilize the secured property by 
making a payment to relevant secured creditor and whether or not to make such payment shall 
be determined in consideration of the going-concern value and the liquidation value of the 
secured property.  However, the parties fail to reach, in many occasions, a conclusion due to the 
information asymmetry, hold-out of any party, etc. In such cases, the creditors’ right to the 
secured property shall be restricted for the debtor’s revival for the benefit of all interested parties. 
The restriction on the secured creditor’s rights in the rehabilitation proceeding shall not 
harm the efficiency of secured claims that play positive functions in our society such as decrease 
of agency costs between the debtor and secured creditors. On the other hand, the adverse effects 
of secured claims shall not be disregarded because from time to time the secured creditors do not 
behave reasonably due to incomplete privatization, reliance on the value of secured property only 
without analyzing the debtor’s credit, etc. If the rehabilitation procedures under the DRBL 
restrict the rights of secured creditors in a reasonable way, the efficiency of secured claims can be 
improved. For such purposes, this chapter offers the following suggestions.
First, secured claim shall be evaluated on the basis of the market value of the secured 
property to reflect current practice. Second, the post-commencement interest shall be paid to the 
extent of the equity cushion of the secured property. Third, the security amount in the case of 
keun-mortgage shall not be crystallized at the time of commencement of the rehabilitation 
proceeding so that the debtor may use the keun-mortgage for DIP financing. Fourth, the cram-
down based on the relative priority rule needs to be modified toward the absolute priority rule, 
provided that the procedures to stimulate the negotiation between the debtor and secured 
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creditors shall be introduced at the same time. Fifth, the debtor who needs to transfer his 
business prior to the court’s confirmation of the rehabilitation plan shall have the right to 
extinguish the security interest on the secured property by paying the disposal value of the 
secured property.
I. Introduction
When secured creditors enforce their security interests, the delinquent 
debtor cannot use the secured property. Thus, the insolvent debtor must 
negotiate with the secured creditors for the continued use of secured 
property. 
Theoretically speaking, the outcome of the negotiation between secured 
creditors and the debtor should be determined at a price between the 
going-concern value and the liquidation value of relevant secured property. 
If the debtor can generate any going-concern value of such property which 
is greater than the liquidation value thereof, the debtor would be willing to 
pay the secured creditors some of such surplus of the going concern value. 
On the other hand, secured creditors would likely have an incentive to 
accept the debtor’s proposal if they can receive such surplus of going 
concern value in addition to the liquidation value of the secured property.
However, the debtor and the secured creditors often fail to strike a 
bargain due to information asymmetry, hold-out of any party, etc. In such 
cases, the debtor cannot continue to operate the business, which may be 
destructive to the going-concern value of the debtor’s business. To avoid 
such destructive outcome, the secured creditors should be restricted from 
enforcing their security interests upon the debtor’s filing of the 
rehabilitation proceeding. 
The scope of such restriction should depend on the social perception 
with respect to the security interests. If secured claims (“SCs”) are regarded 
to function positively, the restriction on SCs under the rehabilitation 
proceeding would be minimal so that such restriction may not harm the 
efficiency of SCs. On the other hand, if SCs are regarded to function 
negatively, the debtor would be given more flexibility to restrict the rights 
of secured creditors.
Chaimujaeui hoesaeng mit pasane gwanhan beobyul [The Debtor Rehabilitation 
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and Bankruptcy Law] (hereinafter the “DRBL”)1) has been enacted to 
stimulate the debtor’s use of the rehabilitation procedure. The DRBL, 
among other things, (i) incorporates the debtor-in-possession (DIP) type 
receiver system,2) (ii) abolishes mandatory declaration of bankruptcy prior 
to the court’s confirmation of the rehabilitation plan, (iii) permits transfer of 
the debtor’s business prior to the court’s confirmation of the rehabilitation 
plan,3) and (v) classifies as the prime priority the loan that the debtor 
obtains during the rehabilitation proceeding,4) etc. However, our legislature 
has neglected to reform the creditor’s position under the rehabilitation 
proceeding. Now, it is time to review the balance between the debtor’s 
rights and the creditor’s rights under the DRBL.
This chapter examines current treatment of the secured creditors in the 
rehabilitation procedure under the DRBL and recommends changes to such 
treatment, considering recent reforms of the insolvency law which 
emphasized the debtor’s rights.
II. Current Treatment of Secured Claims under DRBL
Under the DRBL, SCs include any proprietary claims that are secured 
by a yuchigwon,5) pledges, mortgages, yangdodambo,6) chonsegwon,7) or 
preferred rights created in the debtor’s property at or prior to commencement 
of the rehabilitation proceeding.8) 
During the rehabilitation proceeding, secured creditors cannot exercise 
1) The DRBL took effect from 1 April 2006 and includes chapters on bankruptcy proceeding 
(equivalent to Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code), rehabilitation proceedings (equivalent to 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code), rehabilitation proceedings for an individual 
(equivalent to Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code) and international bankruptcy 
(equivalent to Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code). 
2) DRBL, art. 74(3).
3) Id. art. 62.
4) Id. art. 180(7).
5) Statutory created possessory lien.
6) Security by way of assignment.
7) Leasehold right.
8) DRBL, art. 141.
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their security interests in collaterals and are repaid only in accordance with 
the rehabilitation proceeding. In particular, foreclosures by the secured 
creditors are suspended with a comprehensive stay order at the 
commencement of the rehabilitation proceeding.9) 
The secured creditors may participate in the rehabilitation proceeding 
with respect to their SCs. In order to participate in the rehabilitation 
proceeding, the secured creditors must submit to the court documents 
evidencing the followings: (i) their name and address; (ii) type and cause of 
their SCs; (iii) collateral and its value; (iv) amount of voting right, and (v) 
the name of a debtor, if the SCs are not listed on the schedule submitted by 
the receiver.  However, any unreported and unlisted SCs will be 
extinguished.10) 
The SCs may recover only to the extent of the value of their collateral at 
the time of commencement of the rehabilitation proceeding. The unpaid 
balance of SCs in excess of such value is treated as unsecured claims.11)  
For the purpose of approving the rehabilitation plan in a meeting of 
interested parties, all the secured creditors are categorized into one class,12) 
and an affirmative vote of at least 3/4 of the aggregate value of the SCs is 
required.13) Even if the draft rehabilitation plan has not been approved by 
secured creditors in the meeting of interested parties, the court may 
nonetheless approve the plan by amending the draft rehabilitation plan to 
include a clause to protect secured creditors’ interests.  The Supreme Court 
of Korea has ruled that if secured creditors can get repaid at least the 
liquidation value of their relevant secured property, the secured creditors’ 
interests are deemed protected.14)
Further, the DRBL also guarantees to the secured creditors the 
liquidation value of collateral.15) Liquidation value was not been guaranteed 
to the secured creditors in some reorganization proceedings under 
  9) Id. art. 45, 58.
10) Id. art. 251.
11) Id. art. 141. 
12) Id. art. 236. 
13) Id. art. 237. 
14) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Ma919, Oct. 11, 2007 (S. Kor.).
15) DRBL, art. 243(1)(iv). 
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Hoesajeongribeob [the old Corporate Reorganization Law]16) if a majority of 
the secured creditors agreed. As a result, the status of the secured creditors 
was unstable and the transaction costs increased. Since new rehabilitation 
proceeding under the DRBL guarantees at least the liquidation value of 
collateral for the secured creditors, the problems associated with the 
relative priority rule17) has been mitigated to a certain degree.
Upon the approval of the rehabilitation plan, the debtor is discharged 
from the obligations in respect of all SCs, and all security interests 
established on the debtor’s property are extinguished, unless provided 
otherwise in the rehabilitation plan or the DRBL.18) 
III. Efficiency of Secured Claims
1. Introduction 
Traditionally, there are two views as to whether the restriction on SCs 
under the rehabilitation proceeding maximizes the return to creditors as a 
whole. Each view depends on how the function of SCs in the solvent world 
is understood. The commentators who focus on the positive function of SCs 
support minimal restriction on SCs under the rehabilitation proceeding so 
that the efficiency of SCs may be maintained. On the contrary, the 
commentators who emphasize the negative function of SCs argue for broad 
restrictions on SCs under the rehabilitation proceeding to correct such 
inefficiency allegedly created by SCs. 
2. Positive Function of SCs 
The commentators emphasizing the efficiency of SCs in the solvent 
world argue that pre-petition entitlement of SCs should be respected 
during the rehabilitation proceeding. Under this approach, the absolute 
16) The Corporate Reorganization Law was enacted in 1962, modified several times 
thereafter and finally abolished on March 31, 2006 as the DRBL became effective.
17) The relative priority rule will be reviewed in detail below.
18) DRBL, art. 251. 
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priority rule (the “APR”) would be preferred with the minimal restrictions 
on SCs under the rehabilitation proceeding. The efficiency argument for the 
positive function of SCs is based on the following grounds:
First, when the secured creditors extend loans to the borrower, they 
need not expend significant resources to acquire information about the 
borrower’s probability of default. The borrower can also reduce the cost of 
funding for its business.
Second, the priority of SCs under the Civil Code has been socially and 
economically recognized. To change such recognition in the rehabilitation 
system will increase the costs to both creditors and debtors.
Third, SCs can alleviate the debtor’s overinvestment costs19) because the 
debtor cannot raise fund for such excessive investment if such debtor’s 
properties are collateralized.
Fourth, if a debtor utilizes secured debts, new capital will be injected. 
Then, the unsecured creditors can share the benefits from the liquidity 
provided by the secured creditors to a certain extent because the insolvency 
risk of the debtor is reduced.20)
Fifth, if the secured creditors have unrestricted priority, they do not 
need to compete with other creditors over the properties of the debtor even 
if the debtor is near bankruptcy. Therefore, it will reduce the bankruptcy 
costs.
For the reasons described above, the positive function of SCs must be 
maintained during the rehabilitation proceeding and the priority of SCs 
must be fully respected in the rehabilitation proceeding.
19) Insolvent debtors have incentives to overinvest into high risky business with restricted 
resources to solve their liability problems. See Michelle J. White, The Costs of Corporate 
Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Comparison, Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 
Corporate BankruptCy: eConomiC and legal perspeCtives 18 (Cambridge, 1996). This 
overinvestment effect can be maximized in the case of small- and medium-sized enterprises of 
which the ownership and the management are not separated.
20) Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 duke 
l. J. 425, 441-447 (1997).
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3. Negative Function of SCs
The commentators emphasizing inefficiency of SCs in the solvent 
regime claim that SCs must be restricted under the rehabilitation 
proceeding in order to rectify such inefficiency. If the rehabilitation 
proceeding restricts pre-petition entitlement of SCs, the secured creditors 
will change their behavior to improve the inefficiency of SCs in solvent 
world.
The relative priority rule (the “RPR”) under the rehabilitation proceedings 
is an example that limits the priority of SCs under the Civil Code. The 
argument with respect to the negative function of SCs is based on the 
following grounds:21)
First, SCs diminish some value of non-adjusting unsecured debts. If a 
certain property of the debtor is provided as security for SCs, the debtor’s 
estate which can be used to repay unsecured creditors will decrease. In this 
case, economically, it would be fair for unsecured creditors to increase the 
interest rate. However, there are certain types of unsecured debts whose 
interest rate adjustment is difficult. It includes (i) unsecured debts with an 
interest rate fixed before security interest is granted to third parties, (ii) 
small debts held by creditors who do not monitor their debtors, (iii) tort 
claims and tax claims which have nothing to do with the property of the 
debtor.22) As those unsecured creditors cannot adjust their interest rate 
where the debtor grants a security interest to a third party, they incur losses 
whenever the debtor grants a security interest to secured creditors. 
According to this argument, the secured creditors and the debtor may 
benefit at the expense of the unsecured creditors.
Second, the secured creditors who have a firm security interest in the 
debtor’s property do not have an incentive to monitor the debtor. Therefore, 
the secured creditors do not include covenants to restrict the debtor’s 
21) Yong Seok Park, Efficiency of Korean New Rehabilitation Proceeding, J. kor. l., Vol. 7, No. 2, 
276-278 (2008).
22) Lucian Arye Bebchuck and Jess M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 yale l. J. (1996) 857, 882-883
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inefficient activities in their loan agreements, or do not actively pursue such 
covenants where the debtor defaults. In practice, the real property is 
preferred as collateral. For this reason, the debtor who seeks to raise funds 
for his business tends to procure the real property rather than to increase its 
ability to make payment. This practice may distort the efficient distribution 
of national resources.23)
Third, the going concern value of a company is created by all of the 
interested parties’ participation in the continuing operation of the debtor. 
Therefore, the difference between the going concern value and the 
liquidation value of the debtor should be distributed fairly among the 
interested parties and must not be monopolized by the secured creditors. 
Moreover, the going concern value is roughly calculated based on the 
future earning of the company. Distribution of such value to secured 
creditors may result in incorrect distribution.
Fourth, if the shareholders’ treatment under the rehabilitation plan is 
more favorable than their pre-petition entitlement, the shareholders have 
an incentive to file for bankruptcy at an early stage. Thus, this enhances the 
argument for ex ante efficiency.
Fifth, even in Chapter 11 cases in where the APR is required to be 
applied, bankruptcy courts routinely approve Chapter 11 reorganization 
that deviates from the APR, which favors the shareholders.24) 
23) Dong-whan Kim, Study on Secured Loans - Legal and Economic Perspective, korea institute 
of finanCe (Dec. 2003), 50-51.
24) According to one study conducted by Professor Eberhart, shareholders receive, on 
average, 7.6 percent of total corporate value in excess of their contractual legal entitlements. 
Another study--conducted by Professors LoPucki and Whitford--confirmed that in 21 of the 30 
largest bankruptcy cases in the 1980s, equity received some payout in Chapter 11, rarely 
(though occasionally) amounting to 10 percent of the available assets. Professor Michelle White 
found that equity receives at least 5 percent of the value of all creditors’ claims in all bankruptcy 
reorganizations, with that proportion increasing as the return to creditors increases. Still another 
study conducted by Professor Fabozzi found 20 of 26 large bankruptcies deviating from 
absolute priority in favor of equity, and against unsecured creditors. Whereas in relative terms, 
the divergences from absolute priority rule are small, the amounts of money at stake are 
substantial, reaching $63 million in one case. In almost all the cases examined by Professors 
LoPucki and Whitford, these costs exceeded the direct costs of bankruptcy. A study by 
Professor Brian Betker examining a sample of 75 firms filing for Chapter 11 protection between 
1982 and 1990 yields the most conservative estimate of absolute priority deviations. Betker’s 
results demonstrate a 2.86 percent mean deviation from contractual entitlements under the 
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4. Functions of Secured Claims in Korea
Discussed below is how the function of SCs is regarded in Korea.25)
First of all, the government’s guidance policy finance is usually 
provided to the cases where the market does not function properly. For 
example, government may provide guidance policy loans to the small- and 
medium-sized enterprises that have developed high technology but cannot 
obtain necessary loans to manufacture products by utilizing such 
technology. However, the guidance policy loans26) are used for the 
government’s policy purpose rather than making up for the market failure. 
This practice distorts the distribution of resources because the government’s 
decision is made from time to time on the basis of the information 
asymmetry.27)
Second, with respect to general loans, the lenders, mostly the financial 
institutions, do not make a decision to make a loan based on the information 
obtained with respect to the borrowers because low credibility is given to 
the financial statements submitted by the borrowers, especially small- and 
medium sized enterprises.28) Instead, the lenders rely on the value of 
collaterals provided by the borrowers. As a result, the borrowers tend to 
acquire real properties to use them as collateral, which has contributed the 
price hikes of real estate.29) 
absolute priority rule. Robert Weber, Can the Sauvegarde Reform Save French Bankruptcy Law?: A 
Comparative Look at Chapter 11 and French Bankruptcy Law from an Agency Cost Perspective, 27 
miCh. J. int’l. 257, 268-269 (2005).
25) The researches after the economic crisis of 1997 are examined for this Section because 
prior to the economic crisis, the government’s guidance policy finance consists of major part of 
funding to the private sector.
26) In Korea, the guidance policy loans for small- and medium-sized enterprises are 200 or 
more as of the year of 2005. Samsung Economic Research Institute, seri eConomy foCus No. 42 
(May 30, 2005), at 11.
27) Shi-Yong Yoo & Byung-Seop Yoon, Rate of the Government Loan Program based on 
Rationales of the Government Loan Program, 14 the Journal of korean Corporation management 
assoCiation 35, 50 (2007).
28) Sung Wook Joh, Determinants of Financial Institutions’ Lending to Distressed Firms, 34 the 
Journal of the korean seCurities assoCiation 63, 89 (2005).
29) Young Mi Chang, An Empirical Study on the Loan Decision Making in Local Bank 87 
(2002) (Master’s Thesis, Chosun University).
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Third, external factors affect the financial institutions’ decision of 
whether or not to lend loans.30) For example, if the government plans to 
support the small- and medium-sized enterprises, the financial institutions 
expand the loans to such enterprises. In addition, a borrower that belongs 
to a conglomerate group is able to obtain a loan more easily from the 
financial institutions.31)
Fourth, the officers of the financial institutions are likely to be concerned 
about their own careers and performances when they make a decision to 
lend. Although they may have noticed that the borrowers suffer from 
financial distress, they only provide short-term loans to such financially 
distressed borrowers so as to avoid any immediate insolvency of the 
borrowers that they are in charge of.32)
In Korea, the ownership and management of the small- and medium-
sized firms are not generally separated. Thus, such firms’ overinvestment 
effects would be greater than other cases. The SCs can solve these problems 
because the debtor cannot raise the fund for such overinvestment without 
any collateral. In addition, the SCs help the debtors with sufficient 
collaterals easily procure the fund necessary to operate their business. 
However, the SCs are overused by the financial institutions in Korea. 
The lenders rarely try to exert their efforts in analyzing the borrowers’ 
business and earnings. They simply rely on the collaterals, mostly real 
properties, provided by the borrowers. This practice is not helpful as our 
society has developed to a sound credit community. The borrowers tend to 
procure collaterals which can cause the real estate price hike.
Under these circumstances, the cost incurred with the SCs would likely 
exceed the benefit of the SCs in Korea. The financial institutions’ preference 
of the SCs also causes another inefficiency of the lending market because 
the resources of the lenders would be distributed to the borrowers 
inefficiently. Therefore, the following recommendations in this chapter 
below are based on the negative functions of the SCs and the restriction on 
the SCs under the rehabilitation proceedings in order to achieve the 
30) Bank of Korea, Analysis of Determinants of Operation of Bank’s Fund After Economic Crisis, 
monthly Bulletin, May 2010, at 47.
31) See Joh, supra note 28, p.89.
32) See id.
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efficiency of the SCs in solvency world as well as in insolvency regime.
IV. Evaluation of Secured Object
Under the DRBL, secured creditors may participate in the rehabilitation 
proceeding as unsecured creditors, in respect of any amount of its claims 
that exceeds the value of the secured property (if any prior security interest 
had been created in such property, the amount is calculated by deducting 
the amount of claims secured by the superior security interests from the 
value of the secured property).33) Thus, the valuation of secured property is 
critical because such valuation influences directly the rights of both secured 
creditors and other unsecured creditors. 
Upon assumption of office, the receiver must promptly assess the value 
of all properties that belong to the debtor.34) With respect to the meaning of 
“value,” the Supreme Court of Korea has held that the value of the secured 
properties of the debtor means the going concern value of the relevant 
secured property.35) In current court practice, however, the debtor’s 
properties are generally evaluated at the market value of secured property.36)
There is a continuing debate as to whether the value of secured property 
should be (i) going concern value or (ii) liquidation value. 
The majority commentators take the going concern value as the value of 
the secured property although there is no consensus as to calculation 
method. Some use the capitalized value method37) while others use the 
discounted cash flow method.38) However, the valuation of the secured 
property under this approach is too difficult because not only the future 
earnings from the property but also the applicable capitalization rate or 
33) DRBL, art. 141(3).
34) Id. art. 90.
35) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 90Ma954, May 28, 1991 (S. Kor.). 
36) The market value of specific property may exceed the going-concern value thereof if 
such property is located in expensive area.
37) Jae Hyung Kim, Status of Secured Creditors under Insolvency Procedures, the Journal of 
korean Bar assoCiation, 24 (2006).
38) Won Il Sohn, Valuation of Security in Cram down: Getting American Perspectives into Korean 
Bankruptcy Law, korean Journal of insolvenCy law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 16 (2010).
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discount rate reflecting the risk for future earnings may not be easily 
estimated. 
The minority commentators provide that the value of secured property 
should be based on the liquidation value thereof because secured creditors 
would have expected only the liquidation value of the property for their 
security interests upon the debtor’s defaults.39) However, the liquidation 
value method brings an unfavorable result to secured creditors. In addition, 
it is not appropriate for the rehabilitation proceeding because the debtor 
does not liquidate the business or properties under the rehabilitation 
proceeding.
On the foregoing grounds, this paper supports the current court practice 
with respect to the meaning of the value of secured property. The market 
value can be measured easily and can facilitate more swift process of the 
procedure. The Corporate Reorganization Law of Japan of 2002 also took 
the market value method for the valuation of secured property.40) 
Also, the dispute settlement as to the value of secured property needs to 
be amended. Under the DRBL, the interested party who objects to the value 
of secured property may file with the court an application for the final 
inspection and judgment on SCs.41) If any party is dissatisfied with the 
court’s final inspection and judgment, such party may appeal the judgment 
to the district court.42) The district court’s decision can be subsequently 
appealed to High Court and Supreme Court. To simplify such dispute 
settlement, the current practice should be modified as follows: (i) the 
receiver shall include the market values of secured properties in the list of 
SCs to the court43); (ii) if any interested party raises an objection to such 
market value, the court shall appoint an appraiser who evaluates the 
market value of the relevant property; and (iii) if any objection is raised 
with respect to the appraised value, only the immediate appeal should be 
allowed (and the institution of  normal lawsuit on the appraised value 
39) Won Sam Lee, Evaluation of Asset under Rehabilitation Proceeding under the DRBL, the 
Journal of korean Business law assoCiation,  313 (March 2007).
40) Corporate Reorganization Law of Japan, art. 83(2).
41) DRBL, art. 170.
42) Id. art. 171.
43) The Receiver is obligated to submit the list of SCs. Id. art. 147.
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should not be prohibited). 
V. Treatment of Post-Commencement Interest
The DRBL has no explicit provision on the treatment of the security 
interests after the commencement of the debtor’s rehabilitation proceeding 
but before the court’s confirmation of the rehabilitation plan (“Post-
commencement Interest”). In practice, SCs are entitled to appropriate 
interest rates44) during such period so that the debtor can easily obtain the 
secured creditors’ consent to the draft rehabilitation plan at the creditors’ 
meeting. 
Theoretically speaking, the debtor is not obligated to pay the post-
commencement interests for SCs to the extent that the liquidation value of 
secured property is guaranteed for SCs under the rehabilitation plan. In 
practice, however, the debtor’s payment of the Post-commencement 
Interest may harm ex post efficiency because the secured creditors who are 
fully compensated with the Post-commencement Interest may not actively 
pursue the fast progress of the debtor’s rehabilitation proceeding. Moreover, 
it also distorts the equality between secured creditors and unsecured 
creditors because the debtor’s payment of the post-commencement interest 
reduces the resources for repayment for unsecured creditors. 
Further, it is not reasonable for the debtor to pay the Post-commencement 
Interest when the security interest does not have any equity in the secured 
property. If the aggregate amount of the principal and interest of SCs 
exceeds the value of the secured property, the debtor’s payment of the 
excessive portion to secured creditors reduces the resources available for 
the repayment of unsecured creditors.
Given the foregoing problems, the following reforms on the post-
commencement interest are necessary:
First, the Post-commencement Interest may be paid only to the extent of 
the equity cushion. For any amount beyond such equity cushion, the 
44) Usually annual interest rates of 6-7% are applied. study group of seoul Central distriCt 
Court BankruptCy division, the rehaBilitation proCeeding – law and praCtiCe - (1) 523-524 
(2006).
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oversecured party becomes an undersecured party. 
Second, the Post-commencement Interest should be paid at a fair 
interest rate, not at the market interest rate. The fair interest rate should 
reflect the feasibility of the court’s confirmation of the rehabilitation plan 
and should be determined by the court.
Third, under the Civil Code of Korea, the interest up to one year after 
the principal becomes due is covered by the mortgage.45) To maintain the 
balance with the Civil Code, the payment of the Post-commencement 
Interest under the DRBL shall be restricted up to maximum of one year 
after the commencement order is issued.
VI. Crystallization of Keun-mortgage
The DRBL does not have any explicit provision as to whether the keun-
mortgage should be crystallized at the time of the commencement of the 
debtor’s rehabilitation proceeding.  There are two theories on this issue.
The crystallization of the keun-mortgage upon commencement of a 
rehabilitation proceeding (the “Crystallization Theory”) is supported based 
on following reasons:46) (i) since the management’s authority to operate the 
debtor’s business and to dispose of the debtor’s property is transferred to 
the receiver at the time when the rehabilitation proceeding commences, 
new legal relationship with creditor must be formed at the same time; (ii) 
since the declaration of bankruptcy is interpreted to crystallize the 
mortgage under the Civil Code of Korea, the crystallization under the 
rehabilitation proceeding must be interpreted similarly; (iii) the non-
crystallization theory is useless unless the secured creditors provide 
additional financing based on the equity cushion of secured property; and 
(iv) according to the non-crystallization theory, the operation of mortgage 
for fresh funding after commencement is too complicated because the 
existing mortgage for SCs and new mortgage for post-commencement fund 
45) Civil Code, art. 360.
46) Chae-Woong Lim, Study on Crystallization of Keun-Mortgage and Commencement Order, 
Journal of Court deCision study Vol. VI 141 (August 2003).
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should share the security interest on the same secured property.47)
On the contrary, the non-crystallization of the keun-mortgage upon the 
commencement of a rehabilitation proceeding (the “Non-crystallization 
Theory”) is supported for the following reasons:48) (i) the DRBL does not 
provide any clear rules on this issue and therefore, the Non-crystallization 
Theory is a possible interpretation; (ii) the emphasis must be given to the 
rehabilitation of the debtor but the Crystallization Theory conceptually 
liquidates the debtor at the commencement of the rehabilitation proceeding; 
(iii) under the Non-crystallization Theory, the debtor may be able to 
procure the DIP financing when there exists any equity in the secured 
property.
On this issue, the Supreme Court has held that the keun-mortgage is 
crystallized when the commencement order for the corporate reorganization 
is issued. According to the decision, the receiver cannot procure additional 
loans from secured creditors by using the remaining equity in the secured 
property because the existing keun-mortgage does not cover post-
commencement loans.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision, this paper supports the 
Non-crystallization Theory on the following grounds:
First, when the junior mortgagees obtain the security interest on a 
certain property, they might have ignored the registered maximum amount 
of senior keun-mortgages although the liability owing to senior keun-
mortgages can increase up to the registered maximum amount of senior 
mortgages. If senior mortgagees’ rights are crystallized at actual amount of 
their SCs at the time of the commencement of debtor’s rehabilitation 
proceeding, lower priority mortgagees may receive unfair benefit.
Second, the Non-crystallization Theory permits the debtor to procure 
the DIP financing. Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, there are four paths 
whereby a lender may secure priority for money advanced to a debtor after 
47) Yong-rak, Shin, Commencement Order of Corporate Reorganization Procedure and 
Crystallization of Keun-mortgage, 26 supreme Court law review, 118-119 (1995).
48) Dong-Heum Choi, Study on Crystallization of Keun-Mortgage, 3 daeJon distriCt Court 
praCtiCe researCh Journal 303 (1999).
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the petition date.49) If the DIP borrows in the ordinary course of business, 
then the lender’s claim is a first-priority administrative expense under 
§364(a). Moreover, even outside the ordinary course of business, the 
creditor may get an administrative priority if the post-petition advance and 
the administrative priority are approved by a court order according to 
§364(b). If the DIP cannot get unsecured credit, the court may authorize the 
lender to take a “super-priority” administrative claim, or the court may 
authorize the lender to take a security interest in unencumbered property 
(or a subordinate security interest in encumbered property) under §364(c). 
Finally, if the DIP cannot otherwise procure credit, the court may authorize 
a security interest that is “senior or equal” to an existing security interest, 
which is sometimes referred to as a “priming lien,” according to §364(d) of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Under the DRBL, the post-commencement loan approved by the court 
has a super priority50) which is equivalent to §364(a), (b) and (c) of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. If the Non-crystallization Theory is adopted, then DIP 
financing under §364(d) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code becomes also 
available in Korea because the debtor can utilize the remaining equity in 
the existing senior mortgage which has priority over lower SCs.51) 
Third, the rehabilitation plan may contain a program which requires the 
debtor to procure the financing at the last year of the repayment period. If 
the Non-crystallization Theory is adopted, the feasibility of the debtor’s 
performance of this type of plan becomes more likely because the equity 
cushion of senior security interest increases as the debtor repays according 
to the rehabilitation plan.
49) §364 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See generally John D. Ayer, Michael L. Bernstein & 
Jonathan Friedland, Obtaining Dip Financing And Using Cash Collateral, 23-SEP am. Bankr. inst. J. 
16.
50) If it becomes obvious that the debtor’s property is insufficient for satisfaction of all 
common benefit claims, the common benefit claims shall be paid in proportion to the amount of 
claims, which have not been satisfied yet, despite the statutory preferential rights granted 
thereto. However, this provision shall not affect the validity of any lien, pledge, mortgage, 
Chonsegwon (leasehold rights), and rights of preference which exist in favor of the common 
benefit claims. DRBL, art. 180(7).
51) Dong-hee Nam, Funding Method of Rehabilitation Corporation – Feasibility of Introduction of 
DIP Financing Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 637 lawyers assoCiation Journal, 264-271 
(October 2009).
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The greatest weakness of the Non-crystallization Theory is the 
complication of the legal relationship between the interested parties in 
regard to post-commencement crystallization of the keun-mortgage. However, 
the Corporate Reorganization Law of Japan also adopted the Non-
crystallization Theory in 2002. Accordingly, the following can be considered 
for potential amendments to the DRBL in light of Japanese legislation.52)
First, the keun-mortgage is not automatically crystallized upon the 
commencement of the debtor’s rehabilitation proceeding, but the receiver 
or the mortgagee can request the crystallization of keun-mortgage, if 
necessary.53)
Second, the post-commencement loans shall become secured public 
benefit claims because it is covered by existing keun-mortgage.
Third, the rehabilitation plan shall include clear provisions with respect 
to (i) whether the security interest for pre-commencement SCs is extinguished, 
(ii) whether the debtor can use the increased equity of the security interest 
when the debtor repays according to the plan, (iii) whether the keun-
mortgage is effective if the underlying loan does not exist at the time of 
commencement of the rehabilitation proceeding, etc.
In summary, it is noted that the Non-crystallization Theory requires the 
amendment of the DRBL in order to permit DIP financing.
VII. Relative Priority Rule 
1. Definition of the APR and RPR
The usual explanation of the APR is that pre-petition contractual 
entitlements will be respected in bankruptcy proceedings. Under a strict 
application of the APR, senior creditors must be fully compensated before 
junior creditors receive anything.54) Under the RPR, junior creditors can 
receive something before senior creditors are fully compensated.
52) See generally Yasuyuki Nakai, Several Issues on Crystallization of Principal of Keun-
mortgage, 1755 Banking law Journal 49-52 (2005) (Japanese).
53) Japanese Corporate Reorganization Law, art. 104.
54) Weber, supra note 24, at 259; Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 22, at 862.
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However, the APR is not strictly applicable under any legislature 
because during the debtor’s rehabilitation proceeding, secured creditors are 
not entitled to exercise their pre-petition contractual entitlements. They are 
not allowed to foreclose secured property or to receive the arrears for the 
pre-petition interest. Therefore, the difference between the APR and RPR 
would be the difference of the amount of compensation to be paid to the 
secured creditors during the debtor’s rehabilitation proceeding. Under the 
APR, the secured creditors are compensated for going-concern value or 
market value of the secured property while the RPR compensates the 
secured creditors for the liquidation value of the secured property.55)  
In principle, the DRBL treats the SCs in accordance with the APR 
because the secured creditors are entitled to compensation equivalent to the 
market value of the secured property, as explained in detail in Section IV 
above. However, when the court crams down the secured creditors, the SCs 
can be compensated only for liquidation value of the secured property. In 
this sense, the RPR is applicable as an exception to the general rule under 
the DRBL. 
2. Efficiency of APR and RPR
1) Ex Ante Efficiency
In general, the shareholders of the insolvent company have an incentive 
to over-invest the debtor’s remaining resources in excessively risky 
investments with a potential of a high return so as to solve the liquidity 
shortage of the debtor and to maximize their benefit (the “Overinvestment 
Effect”) as residual claimants. On the other hand, the shareholders have an 
incentive to under-invest in reasonable and safe investments if such 
investments would not solve the liquidity shortage of the debtor (the 
“Underinvestment Effect”). Moreover, the assets of a stable value may be 
exchanged for the assets of a highly fluctuating value. The shareholders 
may gain from such substitution if the value of the new asset increases (the 
“Asset Substitution Effect”).56) Further, the managers of an insolvent 
55) study group of seoul Central distriCt Court BankruptCy division, supra note 44, at 487.
56) The overinvestment effects and underinvestment effects reduce the social welfare by 
encouraging the managers to take on risky projects while the asset substitution does not 
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company have an incentive to delay filing for bankruptcy in order to keep 
their jobs for a longer period and to take a chance for the increase in the 
value of the company’s assets (the “Delay Effect”).57) 
To find whether the APR is more efficient than the RPR or vice versa 
would depend on which rule reduces in a more efficient manner the agency 
costs between the debtor and creditors such as the Overinvestment Effect, 
the Underinvestment Effect, the Asset Substitution Effect and the Delay 
Effect.
First, the RPR reduces the cost of the Delay Effect. During the 
rehabilitation proceeding, the shareholders and the management of the 
insolvent company can possess more value of the company’s business 
under the RPR than under the APR.58) However, the shareholders and the 
management have more incentives to over-invest in excessively risky 
investments before filing for bankruptcy because their costs of failure from 
such overinvestment under the RPR are less than those under the APR.59),60) 
Nonetheless, the costs arising from the Overinvestment Effect may not be 
as great as expected. The management may be reluctant to act at the 
instruction of the shareholders with respect to such overinvestment due to 
a potential liability for the breach of fiduciary duty to the minority 
shareholders. Based on the foregoing analysis, the benefit from saving the 
necessarily reduce the social welfare. In addition, managers who are separated from the 
ownership are not likely to succumb to equity’s pressures to take on risky projects due to 
minority shareholders’ possible litigation against the managers, management of their own 
career and holding their positions, etc.
57) Weber, supra note 24, at 266. The longer a firm delays its entrance into a bankruptcy 
proceeding, the more value will be siphoned off in the form of “financial distress costs.” 
Financial distress costs are typically divided into direct costs (administrative and legal expenses 
of bankruptcy) and indirect costs (trade creditors’ unwillingness to continue doing business 
with the debtor, difficulties in maintaining relationships with suppliers, staff attrition, diverted 
focus from competitiveness to bankruptcy, customer worries about warranties and lost sales, 
and an increased cost of capital).
58) Id. at 278-279.
59) Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 22, at 912-913.
60) Deviations from absolute priority worsen the overinvestment problem for solvent firms. 
These deviations increase the payoff to equity in the failure state while not affecting its payoff in 
the success state. Hence, the equity has a greater incentive to invest in a project with a high 
failure probability if the project has a high payoff in the success state. See Alan Schwartz, The 
Absolute Priority Rule and the Firm’s Investment Policy 72 wash. u.l.Q. 1213, 1217 (1994).
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cost of the Delay Effect would likely be greater than the cost from the 
Overinvestment Effect.61)
2) Ex Post Efficiency
Under the RPR approach, once the debtor files for bankruptcy, the 
shareholders are likely to urge the management to undertake reasonable 
and safe investments. The value gained from such investments will be 
shared between the creditors and the shareholders because the residual 
claimant would also receive some values under the RPR. Thus, the RPR 
reduces the cost of the Underinvestment Effect62) and the Asset Substitution 
Effect63) after the bankruptcy is filed. This also offsets the cost of the 
Overinvestment Effect.64) However, the APR does not have the 
aforementioned ex post efficiency because the shareholders cannot obtain 
any benefit until after the creditors are fully compensated.
3. RPR for Secured Claims under the DRBL
For the purpose of approving the rehabilitation plan in a meeting of 
interested parties, all secured creditors are categorized into one class,65) and 
affirmative vote of at least 3/4 of the aggregate value of the SCs is 
required.66) According to the DRBL, even if the draft rehabilitation plan has 
not been approved by secured creditors in the meeting of interested parties, 
61)  Weber, supra note 22, 278.
62) When the firm is insolvent, neither convertibles nor call provisions can mitigate the 
overinvestment problem because the conversion option or the call privilege becomes valueless. 
Deviations from absolute priority are helpful, however, because when absolute priority is not 
strictly followed, the equity participates in the creditors’ payoff. This participation creates an 
incentive for equity not to reduce the value of the debt; and this incentive partly countervails 
the equity’s incentive to take high risk projects with high payoffs. See Schwartz, supra note 60, at 
1217.
63) Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives 
72 wash. u.l.Q. 1159, 1186 (1994).
64) In addition, the post-petition debtor cannot participate in the unreasonable project 
because of the court’s supervision of the debtor’s management of its business and disposal of its 
assets.
65) DRBL, art. 236.
66) Id. art. 237.
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the court may approve the plan by amending the draft plan to include a 
clause to protect secured creditors’ right through one of the following 
methods:67) 
(i) transferring to a new company or to a third party the property 
subject to the security interest of the secured creditors, or keeping 
the property in the debtor company while such security interest 
remains effective;
(ii) repaying, distributing to or depositing for, secured creditors 
the sales proceeds of the collateral less the sales cost after such 
collateral have been sold at the price of at least the fair market value 
as determined by the court (without considering the encumbrances 
on the collateral in such valuation);
(iii) paying the holder of the right the fair market value of such 
right as determined by the court; or
(iv) any method which would protect the holder of the right 
fairly and equitably and is similar to the foregoing.
The fair market value referred to in (ii) above is construed as liquidation 
value of the property. This construction is based on the theory that the sale 
of collateral can be regarded as partial liquidation of the company’s 
property. For the same reason, the fair market values referred to in (iii) and 
(iv) are interpreted to mean the amount equal to the liquidation value. 
Based on this interpretation, the court may include in the plan a right 
protection clause that the secured creditors are repaid only the liquidation 
value of the secured property when the rehabilitation plan is not approved 
for the secured creditors’ objection.68) Accordingly, when the court crams 
down the dissenting secured creditors, the value exceeding the liquidation 
value of the secured property may be distributed to the junior creditors. In 
this sense, the RPR is applicable under the DRBL.69)
67) Id. art. 244(1). This is equivalent to the cram-down under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
68) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Ma919, Oct. 11, 2007; 2004Geu31, Nov. 14, 2005; 2002Geu121, 
Dec. 10, 2004 (S. Kor.).
69) Some scholars allege that the relative priority rule under the DRBL allows SCs to be 
paid fully with haircut of unsecured claims and redemption of shares and that in such a case, 
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The DRBL’s position on the RPR in connection with the court’s cram-
down is criticized on the following grounds:
First, under the RPR, secured creditors are repaid an amount which is 
determined between the liquidation value and the going-concern value of 
the secured property. The compensation amount for the secured creditors 
depends on the outcome of negotiation between the debtor and the 
creditors or the court’s cram-down. Thus, the RPR makes the negotiation 
between the parties prolonged and increases ex post efficiency.
Second, when the rehabilitation plan is not approved due to secured 
creditors’ objection, the Supreme Court has confirmed the same plan by 
cramming down dissenting secured creditors, to the extent that at least the 
liquidation value of secured property is paid to SCs.70) If the Supreme Court 
maintains this interpretation, the voting system for creditors’ approval of 
the draft rehabilitation plan becomes meaningless because the court can 
cram down the creditors’ objection without including any right protection 
clause for the dissenting creditors.
Third, under the DRBL, the payment of the liquidation value to SCs 
under the rehabilitation plan was newly incorporated as one of requirements 
for the court to confirm the plan.71) Therefore, the payment of the liquidation 
value of secured property to SCs can no longer be a means of protection for 
secured creditors who raised objection to the draft rehabilitation plan.
Fourth, when the rehabilitation plan is not approved by dissenting 
creditors, the court has its absolute discretion to confirm the rehabilitation 
plan by including a right protection provision for dissenting creditors in the 
plan. Some courts cram down dissenting creditors more often than other 
courts. Thus, the debtor has an incentive to undertake a forum shopping 
when they expect dissenting creditors to their plans.
4. APR under Amendment Bill of DRBL
As pointed out above, the court has the full discretion to incorporate a 
the absolute priority rule is said to be actually adopted. See Jae-Hyung Kim, supra note 37, at 26. 
70) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Ma919, Oct. 11, 2007 (S. Kor).
71) DRBL, art. 243(1).
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right protection clause in the rehabilitation plan when the court crams 
down dissenting creditors. As a result, the creditors have often complained 
that they are left unknown of their own rights once they raise objection to 
the draft rehabilitation plan proposed by the debtor. 
Considering such complaints, the Ministry of Justice submitted in 2011 a 
proposed bill to modify current cram-down practice (the “2011 DRBL Bill”). 
According to the 2011 DRBL Bill, when senior creditors raise objection to 
the draft rehabilitation plan, then they must be fully compensated before 
junior creditors receive anything, and the court can confirm the draft 
rehabilitation plan at its discretion only if this requirement is fulfilled.72)
The 2011 DRBL Bill clarifies the priority of claims under the DRBL and 
protects pre-petition contractual entitlements of the creditors. However, the 
2011 DRBL Bill has been criticized on the following grounds:
First, in the course of the debtor’s rehabilitation proceeding under the 
DRBL, the court evaluates the debtor’s business and the value of secured 
property. As a result, the creditors are fully and exactly aware of their 
portions of distribution before they negotiate the distributions under the 
rehabilitation plan.  However, under the 2011 DRBL Bill, senior creditors no 
longer have any incentive to undertake negotiation with junior creditors 
because the senior creditors are guaranteed for full compensation without 
any further action. Consequently, all negotiations between the debtor and 
creditors would likely be useless and the parties probably would rely on 
the court’s cram-down even more. 
To avoid this result, current evaluation system should be modified so 
that the interested party, not the court, undertakes the valuation of the 
debtor’s business or the secured property. In this case, the relevant parties 
have an incentive to engage in negotiation with other parties because they 
may omit the evaluation proceeding through mutual agreement.
Second, the shareholders do not have any incentive to file for bankruptcy 
at an early stage because they will likely be entitled to nothing if the 
creditors do not approve the draft rehabilitation plan prepared by the 
shareholders during the debtor’s rehabilitation proceeding. Such Delay 
Effect would seriously distort ex ante efficiency, especially in the case of 
72) 2011 DRBL Bill, art. 244(2), (3).
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small- and medium-size companies where the ownership and the control 
are not separated.
Third, according to the 2011 DRBL Bill, the court’s valuation of the 
debtor’s business or secured property becomes critical because such 
valuation eventually determines the amount of distributions among the 
interested parties. Thus, the interested parties become very sensitive to the 
outcome of the appraised value and will likely try to challenge such 
appraised value through litigation.  This process will prolong the debtor’s 
rehabilitation proceeding to a certain extent
Fourth, under the 2011 DRBL Bill, the court is obligated to confirm the 
plan if the APR is complied. Such practice would cause the inefficiency 
because secured creditors can always insist on the debtor’s repayment of 
the maximum going-concern value of secured property. Agreement among 
the interested parties to achieve the plan will become meaningless because 
the court will confirm the plan to the extent that the APR is maintained in 
the plan.
Therefore, simply adopting the APR is not enough to solve the problem 
arising with respect to the RPR under current DRBL. To complement the 
proposed APR under the 2011 DRBL Bill, the DRBL should incorporate the 
systematic approaches to stimulate the negotiation between the debtor and 
creditors, such as modification of the valuation method, adoption of the 
debtor’s exclusive proposal of the plan, the court’s discretion to confirm the 
plan when any class of rehabilitation creditors raise objection to the plan, etc.
VIII. Adoption of System to Extinguish Security Interests
1. Introduction
The Civil Rehabilitation Act of Japan (the “JCRA”), which was enacted 
in 1999 as the new general reorganization regime in Japan, provides a 
unique procedure that restricts the rights of secured creditors called “the 
procedure of extinguishing security interests.”73) This procedure permits a 
73) Civil Rehabilitation Act of Japan, art. 148-152.
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debtor to cancel security interests in any property necessary for continued 
operation of her business by paying the secured creditors the value of such 
property. 
Under the DRBL, if deemed necessary for the debtor’s rehabilitation, 
after commencement of the rehabilitation proceeding and even prior to 
confirmation of the rehabilitation plan, the receiver may transfer, with the 
court’s approval, the entire or material part of the operation or business of 
the debtor.74) However, if the maxium registered amount of security interest 
exceeds the proceeds from such transfer, the receiver cannot consummate 
the business transfer. To facilitate the business transfer during the 
rehabilitation proceeding, the procedure of extinguishing security interests 
needs to be incorporated in the DRBL.
2. Relationship with Cram-down
 Extinguishing security interests and the cram-down have similar effect 
that security interests can be extinguished without regard to secured 
creditors’ intention to maintain such security interests. Both procedures can 
avoid inefficiency which may arise from the secured creditors’ unreasonable 
behaviors. 
However, both procedures have the following differences.
First, the procedure of extinguishing security interests can be used prior 
to the court’s confirmation of the rehabilitation plan while the court’s cram-
down can be utilized at the time the court’s confirmation of the rehabilitation 
plan.
Second, the debtor (or the receiver) has the option to exercise its right of 
extinguishing security interests while the court has the discretion to 
incorporate the cram-down clause in the plan. However, the debtor must 
obtain the court’s approval to exercise the right of extinguishing security 
interests.
Third, the procedure of extinguishing security interests requires the 
debtor to make a one-time payment of the value of the collateral whereas 
the court’s cram-down permits the debtor to make deferred cash payments 
equivalent to the value of the collateral. To determine whether the 
74) DRBL, art. 62.
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requirements of cram-down are satisfied, the court must estimate not only 
the value of the collateral but also the value of deferred cash payments 
promised in the plan which requires examination of the feasibility of the 
plan.75) In this sense, the procedure of extinguishing security interests is 
much more efficient than the cram-down when the security interest on a 
specific property is cancelled. 
3. Efficiency of Extinguishing Security Interests
The procedure of extinguishing security interests can enhance ex post 
efficiency because this procedure can block secured creditor’s unreasonable 
behaviors, such as holding-up and circumvent time-consuming negotiation 
between the debtor and the secured creditors.
However, it may harm ex ante efficiency seriously. If this procedure is 
adopted, the secured creditors’ position becomes very unstable because 
their secured interests can be extinguished without regard to their intention 
during the debtor’s rehabilitation proceeding. Thus, the positive function of 
SCs as explained above will be adversely affected. In addition, adopting the 
procedure of extinguishing security interests is equivalent to adopting the 
RPR in the DRBL because the benefit from cancelling the security interests 
by paying the value of the collateral will pass to other stakeholders. On the 
contrary, the debtor should assume higher costs to use the security interests 
on the properties with low disposal value such as the equipment.76) 
However, the procedure of extinguishing security interests may provide 
the debtor with an incentive to file for bankruptcy at an early stage because 
the debtor can benefit from extinguishing security interests. In this respect, 
the harms to ax ante efficiency may be offset to a certain extent.
75) Wataru Tanaka, Extinguishing Security Interests: Secured Claims in Japanese Business 
Reorganization Law and Some Policy Implications For U.S. Law, 22 emory Bankr. dev. J. 427, 431-432 
(2006).
76) Wataru Tanaka, Economic Analysis of Claims to Extinguish the Secured Claims(2) NBL No. 
801 (15 January 2005). p.45 (15 January 2005).
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4. Adoption of Procedure of Extinguishing Security Interests
Considering the inefficiency which may result upon adopting the 
procedure of extinguishing security interests, this article suggests that the 
procedure should be used only for business transfer by the receiver. In 
other words, the receiver should be able to use the option to cancel the 
security interest on the property to be transferred by paying the value of 
secured property. If the scope applicable to this procedure is restricted, 
adverse effects thereof can also be minimized.
IX. Conclusion
Korean insolvency law has focused on the improvement of the 
rehabilitation proceeding under the DRBL from the debtor’s perspective. It 
is time to examine relevant provisions of the DRBL on the creditors’ 
position to learn whether current laws and practices help achieve the 
efficiency in terms of maximized return to creditors as a whole. Considering 
negative functions of secured claims for solvent companies in Korean 
society, this paper recommends the following amendments to enhance the 
efficiency of secured claims.
First, the practice of using the market value of secured property for the 
purpose of evaluation of secured claims should be incorporated into the 
DRBL. 
Second, the Post-commencement Interest of secured claims should be 
included in the definition of secured claims only to the extent the principal 
and interest of secured claims do not exceed the value of secured property.
Third, the keun-mortgage should not be automatically crystallized at the 
time of commencement of the debtor’s rehabilitation proceeding. The 
flexibility in crystallization of the keun-mortgage will help the debtor 
procure the DIP financing.
Fourth, the RPR should be modified to the APR on the condition that 
the procedures to facilitate the negotiation between the debtor and secured 
creditors are adopted at the same time.
Fifth, the procedure to extinguish security interests should be adopted 
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in the case of the debtor’s transfer of business in order to facilitate the 
debtor’s business transfer.
It is noteworthy that the reform of Korean insolvency law can be 
completed only when the procedures for both sides –creditors’ side and 
debtor’ side- are improved in balance.
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